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RECLAMATION OF GOODS FROM A
FRAUDULENT BUYER
Robert Braucher*
2-702(2) and (3) 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(Code), defining the right of a seller to reclaim goods from an
insolvent buyer, have for years been the subject of controversy.2 The
sponsors of the Code have stood firm on the basic policy of these
sections for more than twenty-five years, but, in its 1966 Official
Recommendations for Amendment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the Permanent Editorial Board includes an amendment striking the words "or lien creditor" from section 2-702(3). That change
has already been made in six states: California, Illinois, Maine, New
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• Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1936, Haverford College; LL.B. 1939,
Harvard University. Although the author is chairman of the subcommittee of the
Permanent Editorial Board which recommended to the Board the amendment of section
2-702 of the Code, the comments here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of any other person or group.-Ed.
I. § 2-702. Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency.

(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller
in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not
apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to
reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency
or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser (or lien creditor] under this
Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies
with respect to them. (Brackets indicate language to be deleted.)
2. See ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD, SUPPLEMENT No. I TO THE 1952 u.c.c. 106-07 (1955);
I REP. N.Y. LAW R.Ev. COMM. 105, 129 (1954); I id. at 547.49 (1955); I id. at 395 (1956);
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE u. C. c. 72; Bigham, Tennessee
Law and the Sales Article of the UCC, 17 VAND. L. R.Ev. 873, 905-07 (1964); Braucher, Sale
of Goods in the UCC, 26 LA. L. REv. 192, 220-21 (1966); Braucher, The UCC-A Third
Look1, 14 W. R.Es. L. REv. 7, 16 (1962); Duesenberg, Title: Risk of Loss and Third Parties,
30 Mo. L. REv. 191, 209-10 (1965); Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and
Defrauded Sellers-Amending the UCC to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 CoM. L.J.
86 (1962); Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales
Articles of the UCC, 48 CoRNELL L.Q. I, 28-29 (1962); Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to
Chattel Security in the UCC: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. R.Ev. 571, 578 (1958);
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the UCC: Some Problems Suggested by
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518, 549-56 (1960); MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make
a Right, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 676, 680 (1959); Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code,
6 Bus. I.Aw. II3, 145, 161-62 (1951); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating
to the Sale of Goods Under the UCC, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 218-23 (1963); Shanker, A Reply
to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3), 14 W. R.Es. L. REv. 93 (1962);
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L.
R.Ev. 561, 585 (1950); 45 CORNELL L.Q. 566 (1960); 79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 598, 608-13 (1966);
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 418, 436-37; 68 YALE L.J. 751, 757 (1959).
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Jersey, New Mexico, and New York. In order to understand and
evaluate it, one must unravel an intricate tangle of state and federal
law.
I. THE PROBLEM
Since In re Kravitz3 must be considered in any discussion of reclamation under the Code, we can use its facts to pose the basic
situation with which sections 2-702(2) and (3) deal. In Kravitz, radios
were bought on credit on Thursday and delivered on Friday. The
following Monday a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the
buyers, and on Tuesday the seller took the necessary steps to rescind
the sale. A petition to reclaim the goods from the trustee in bankruptcy was filed, but by stipulation the goods were sold and the proceeds substituted. The referee in bankruptcy denied reclamation and
allowed the seller a general claim for nearly $21,000. The district
court and the court of appeals affirmed.
The referee was prepared to find that on Thursday the buyers
knew they were hopelessly insolvent and could not pay for the goods,
and knowingly concealed their insolvency from the seller. He thought
it unnecessary to decide whether there were actual misrepresentations or whether under Pennsylvania law something less would entitle the seller to rescind. Under Pennsylvania law, he held, a
defrauded seller could not reclaim goods from a levying creditor of
the buyer if the creditor's claim arose after delivery of the goods to
the buyer; under section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee had
the rights of such a creditor. The district court reached the same result as the referee but took a somewhat different view-that the
seller could reclaim only if there had been a positive misrepresentation, and that there was no proof of such a misrepresentation.4 The
court of appeals affirmed but adopted the referee's analysis. 5
II.

PRE-CODE LAW

A. State Law
The Uniform Sales Act contained no provision on reclamation
by a seller by reason of insolvency or fraud of the buyer. It was gen3. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960). The referee's decision is reported at 33 REF. J. 57
(1959); accord, In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 46 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Eastern
Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964); cf.
Metropolitan Distribs. v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 128 (C.P. 1959).
4. Dist. Ct. opinion in Kravitz, [1956-1959 Transfer Binder] CCH BANKER. L. REP.
1J 59,607 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
5. 278 F.2d at 823.

May 1967]

Article Two: Reclamation

1283

erally assumed that a defrauded seller could replevy the goods sold
as against the buyer himself, but that insolvency without fraud was
not a basis for rescission and replevin. 6 Amid some dispute, there
was substantial authority that a hopelessly insolvent buyer who received goods on credit was fraudulent if he knew payment was extremely unlikely and failed to disclose that fact, even though he
intended to pay if he could.7
The right of the seller to reclaim from the insolvent buyer himself is largely academic, since control of the goods could also be obtained by a levy under a judgment for the price. 8 The question
whether there is a right to reclaim ordinarily becomes critical only
when there is a third-party claimant. Bona fide subpurchasers from
the insolvent buyer have long been protected against avoidance of
the buyer's voidable title. 9 But it has been widely held that a levying
creditor of the fraudulent buyer is not such a purchaser, at least
where he extends credit before the fraudulent sale.10 Even where
credit is extended after the sale, the orthodox rule would protect the
levying creditor only if he purchases at an execution sale and pays
the purchase price without notice of the fraud, or if there is an
estoppel. 11 The defrauded seller is estopped if by words or conduct
he induces the creditor to believe that the fraudulent buyer is the
owner of the goods, if he has reason to know that the creditor is
likely to extend credit in reliance on the apparent ownership, and
if the creditor does extend credit in reliance thereon.12
A few cases, however, have applied a flat rule that creditors who
extend credit to the buyer after he has taken possession under his
fraudulent purchase and who levy on the goods are not subject to
the seller's right to reclaim. Pennsylvania decisions to this effect
6. See 3 WILLISTON, SALFS §§ 636-37 (rev. ed. 1948); REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs §§ 47176 (1932).
7. See, e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933).
8. Such levies are commonly free of any exemption claim by the buyer. See In re
Rade, 205 F. Supp. 336 (D. Colo. 1962); Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 458 (1960); 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1470 (1959). Contra,
Helton v. Vanderpool, 251 Ky. 312, 64 S.W.2d 883 (1933); cf. Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1329
(1944) (burden of identification).
9. See UNIFORM SALFS Acr § 24; 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at§ 650; REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 476 (1932); accord under the Code, In re Haywood Woolen Co., 3
U.C.C. Rep. ll07 (D. Mass. 1967); cf. Evans Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Ore.
1966).
IO. See 3 Scorr, TRusrs §§ 308-09.I, 313, 475 (2d ed. 1956); 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra
note 6, at § 620; Annot., 21 A.L.R. 1031, 1033 (1922).
II. See REsrATEMENT, REsrrruTION § 173 (1937) comments j and k, referring to
REsrATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 306-09, 313 (1935).
12. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 313 comment a (1957).
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were relied on in In re Kravitz, 13 and there are a few· decisions in
other states suggesting a similar rule. 14 Some decisions seem to treat
any levying creditor without notice of the fraud as a bona fide
purchaser,15 and occasionally an assignee for the benefit of creditors
has been treated as a purchaser for value.16
B. Bankruptcy Law
The right of a seller to reclaim goods from a fraudulent buyer
has probably been litigated most frequently in cases in which the
buyer was bankrupt. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, the Supreme Court held that only the defeasible title of the fraudulent
buyer passed to his assignee in bankruptcy and that the assignee
could not recover goods which had been returned to the seller before bankruptcy or retaken by him from the assignee.17 Those decisions were followed in a large number of cases arising under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,18 and the right of reclamation was often
treated as a matter of general law without reference to state court
decisions.19
Until 1910, the trustee's right to property in such cases depended
on section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, vesting in the
trustee "the title of the bankrupt" to all property "which prior to
the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
against him ...." Where an adverse claim could have been defeated
by a purchaser from the bankrupt or by a levying creditor of the
bankrupt but there had been no purchase or levy, the trustee was
held to take only the bankrupt's title.20 In 1910, to change this rule,
Congress enacted the "strong-arm clause," section 47a(2), which later
13. 278 F.2d at 822 citing Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 27 Atl. 300 (1893);
Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901).
14. See McAuliffe &: Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 218, 154 N.E. 755, 756
(1927) (creditor attaching "for a preexisting debt" is not a purchaser for value); Hurd
v. Bickford, 85 Me. 217, 218, 27 Atl. 107, 108 (1892) ("This distinction between the
rights of prior and subsequent creditors does not seem to have been always recognized."); Bradley v. Obear, 10 N.H. 477,480 (1839).
15. See Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 Ill. 499 (1878), criticized in East St. Louis Lumber
Co. v. Schnipper, 310 Ill. 150, 159, 141 N.E. 542, 545 (1923).
16. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Whitehead, 115 Va. 586, 80 S.E. 104 (1913).
17. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876); Montgomery v. Bucyrus Mach. Works,
92 U.S. 257 (1875); cf. Turner v. Ward, 154 U.S. 618 (1876).
18. See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.41 (1964); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929).
19. Cf. Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 839 (1951).
20. York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906); Hewit v. Berlin Mach. Works, 194
U.S. 296 (1904); cf. Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.S. 545 (1910); Security Wareliousin~ CQ. v, f!and, 206 T,J.$. 415 (1907).
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became section 70c.21 As to property coming into the custody of the
bankruptcy court, the new provision vested in the trustee "all the
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings thereon ...."
The effect of the 19 IO provision was considered in a few cases of
reclamation from a fraudulent buyer, and the statute stimulated
attention to the relevant state law. In one case, in which the fraudulent buyer had contracted many other debts after receiving the goods
in question, the court analogized the trustee in bankruptcy to an
innocent party who has taken a mortgage for a valuable consideration, and denied reclamation.22 In the others, reclamation was
granted on the ground that under the relevant state law a defrauded
seller would prevail over a levying creditor of the buyer.23
If goods held by a fraudulent buyer are subject to reclamation
from his trustee in bankruptcy, a return or retaking of the goods
shortly before bankruptcy should not be a preference voidable by
the trustee, even though the other elements of a voidable preference
are present, since there is no diminution of the assets of the estate.
Numerous cases have so held.24 If the identity of the property has
been lost, a transfer of other assets may be preferential; but if the
fraudulent buyer still has possession of the property fraudulently
obtained, compensation of the seller with other property is to that
extent a transfer for new value and hence not a preference.25
III. THE

HISTORY OF SECTION

2-702

Prior to 1951, no reference to the rights of lien creditors appeared
in the drafts of the provisions which became section 2-702 of the
Code. In the 1941 draft, there were provisions that "[a] buyer by
buying or contracting to buy on credit warrants that he is and will
remain solvent," that "[a] buyer by taking delivery of goods on
credit represents that at the time of taking delivery he is solvent,"
21. 36 Stat. 838 (1910); see 4 CoLIJER, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 70.47.
22. In re Whatley Bros., 199 Fed. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1912) (Georgia law).
23. In re Perelstine, 19 F.2d 408 (W.D. Pa. 1927) (Pennsylvania law); Jones v. H. M.
Hobbie Grocery Co., 246 Fed. 431 (5th Cir. 1917) (Alabama law); In re Gold, 210 Fed.
410 (7th Cir. 1913) (Illinois law); In re J. S. Appel Suit & Cloak Co., 198 Fed. 322
(D. Colo. 1912) (Colorado law).
24. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. I (1924); Kamberg v. Springfield Nat'! Bank,
293 Mass. 24, 199 N.E. 339 (1935); see 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 60.18; Annot.,
103 A.L.R. 310 (1936).
25. Hough v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 34 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1929); Illinois Parlor
Frame Co. v. Goldman, 257 Fed. 300 (7th Cir. 1919); cf. Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d
684 (9th Cir. 1951).
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and that bankruptcy within ten days after taking delivery "raises a
presumption that the buyer's procurement of delivery was in breach
of this representation." 26 The accompanying comment discussed the
"conflict in present case-law on what amounts to a sufficient misrepresentation" and strongly recommended that "presumptions" be
removed and that "flat legal effect" be substituted. 27 The 1944 draft
adopted that recommendation:
(1) If the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent or a petition in
bankruptcy or for receivership is filed by or against the buyer or he
makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the seller may
{b) reclaim any goods received by the buyer on credit and still
held by him if any of the above-described events occurs within
ten days after such receipt. No misrepresentation of solvency
made by the buyer enlarges this period for reclamation unless
made in writing to the particular seller within three months
before delivery of the goods.2s

Drafts published in the years 1948-1951 changed the wording
somewhat. In 1948, the preamble was simplified: references to bankruptcy, receivership, and assignment for creditors were deleted, so
that the subsection (I) applied "[w]here the seller discovers the
buyer to be insolvent." 29 Subsection (l)(b) was made "subject to the
rights of a good faith purchaser under Section 57" (later section
2-403). What is now the last sentence of subsection (3) was added:
"Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with
respect to them." In 1949, the section was given its present number.30
In 1950, the section on good faith purchase was changed to refer to
"a buyer in the ordinary course of business" and a provision was
added that "the extent to which other purchasers take free of the
rights of a secured lender is governed by the Article on Secured
Lenders (Article 9)."31 The cross-reference in section 2-702 was conformed; making the seller's right to reclaim "subject to the rights
of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under
26. REvlsED UNIFORM SALES Am:§ 16-C (Report and Second Draft 1941); see Braucher,
The Legislative History of the Uniform Commerdal Code, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958).
27. REVISED UNIFORM SALES Am:§ 16-C, comment (Report and Second Draft 1941).
28. REVISED UNIFORM SALES Am: § 104 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
29. CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW art. II,§ 103 (1948).
30. U.C.C. §§ 2-405, 2-702 (May 1949 Draft). At the same time, the cross-reference was
changed to rights of a good faith purchaser "under this Article (Section 2-405)."
31. U.C.C. §§ 2-403, 2-702 (Spring 1950 Draft). The section was also renumbered to
its present number, § 2-403.
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this Article (Section 2-403)." The reclamation provisions of section
2-702 were not amended further until after the Code was approved
by the sponsoring organizations and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association in 1951.32
After those approvals, references to a "lien creditor" were inserted in sections 2-403 and 2-702.33 No explanation of the insertion
seems ever to have been published; it appears highly probable that
it was regarded as an insubstantial editorial change, simply making
cross-reference to Articles Six, Seven, and Nine for rules which might
prevent reclamation in cases of bulk transfers, documents of title,
or secured transactions. The early drafts confirm what one would
have inferred-that is, that the draftsmen from the beginning had
bankruptcy in mind and intended to authorize reclamation in bankruptcy in the circumstances defined in section 2-702. Nothing in the
history of that section through its promulgation and enactment in
Pennsylvania in 1953 suggests any weakening of that intention.
The next phase of the history is the consideration of the Code by
the New York Law Revision Commission and the response of the
sponsors' Editorial Board, culminating in the 1956 Recommendations of the Board and the enactment of the revised Code in Massachusetts in 1957.34 Again there is no indication of any shift in the
intentions of the draftsmen. The first reaction of the Editorial
Board was the publication in January 1955 of Supplement Number
1 to the 1952 text of the Code. The supplement included a report
of a subcommittee of which the present writer was chairman; that
report dealt with sections 2-403 and 2-702 under the heading "Answers to Criticisms of Certain Sections."35 The report responded to
criticism that reclamation under section 2-702 "might conflict with
the Bankruptcy Law as a preference" by pointing out that "Comment 2 sets up a fraud theory which might well be followed under
the Federal Bankruptcy Act to preserve the right of reclamation
granted by this section," citing California Conserving Co. v.
D'Avanzo,36 a bankruptcy decision. Later, the two sections were revised, following suggestions of the New York Commission, but only
for clarification of such subsidiary matters as the sufficiency of a de32.
1951).
33.
34.
35.
36.

U.C.C. at v (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1951); U.C.C. at v (Final Text Edition,
U.C.C. §§ 2-403, 2-702 (Official Draft, 1952).
See Braucher, The 1956 Revision of the UCC, 2 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1956).
See ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 2, at 102, 106.
62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933).
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mand within ten days to support later repossession and the nonexclusion of reclamation for misrepresentation of facts other than
solvency or intent to pay.37

IV.

RELATED CODE PROVISIONS

Although Kravitz dealt with facts which occurred in 1958, the
1953 version of the Code was applied since the 1956 revision was not
effective in Pennsylvania until January I, 1960. But there is nothing
to indicate that the revision would have affected the court's reasoning or decision. Accordingly, the following discussion refers to relevant Code sections as they were revised in 1956. None of these
sections was the subject of any amendment promulgated by the
Board before 1966.
As has been indicated, section 2-702 on reclamation refers to sec•
tion 2-403 for the rights of lien creditors to which the right of reclamation is subject. Section 2-403 in tum states that those rights "are
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk
Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." Examination of Articles Six, Seven, and Nine leads to only one section which
seems relevant to the facts of Kravitz: section 9-301(3), defining "lien
creditor" to mean a levying creditor and to include a trustee in bankruptcy. Judge Goodrich, who wrote for the Court of Appeals in
Kravitz, was also Director of the American Law Institute, one of the
organizations which sponsored the Code. He followed the two-step
cross-reference this far, and it is hard to see how he could have followed it further. He then fell back on section 1-103, which makes
supplementary general principles of law applicable "unless displaced
by the particular provisions of this Act." The pre-existing Pennsylvania law subordinating the reclamation seller's interest to that of a
lien creditor who extended credit subsequent to the sale, he held,
was not so "displaced" by section 2-702.
A contrary holding could have been based on a plausible reading
of these sections. In view of the policy of uniformity expressed in
section 1-102(2)(c), and the conflicting pre-Code decisions in the
various states, it would have been possible to read section 2-702 as
occupying the field of reclamation for a buyer's misrepresentation of
solvency or of intent to pay. A lien creditor of the buyer could then
prevail over a reclaiming seller only if his rights were rights "under
this Article (Section 2-403)." The reference to section 2-403 need not
37. 1956

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE

U.C.C. 52, 72.
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be exclusive of other sections; thus, given a different factual situation, a levying creditor might be permitted to take advantage of
section 2-326, under which goods held on consignment are in some
circumstances "deemed to be on sale or return" and thus subject to
claims of the buyer's creditors while in the seller's possession.38 The
reference to section 2-403 and the further reference to Articles Six,
Seven, and Nine could be given meaning with respect to lien creditors by, for example, section 9-301(l)(b), which subordinates a
seller's unperfected security interest to the rights of a levying creditor of the buyer; a seller with such an interest would then not be
permitted to mend his hold by reclaiming under section 2-702.
Kravitz went beyond such references and subjected the right of reclamation also to any rights that levying creditors of the buyer might
have under pre-Code law.
Several other sections have been brought into the discussion of
section 2-702 in the legal literature. One is section 2-507(2), which
provides: "Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to
the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the
seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making
the payment due." The comment to that section states that the
words "right as against the seller" are used as words of limitation to
conform with Code policy on bona fide purchase; the comment
refers to the possibility of waiver and adds that the ten day limitation of section 2-702 "is also applicable here." Sections 2-507 and
2-702 may overlap in a case of payment for goods by a check which
is later dishonored. The Kentucky Supreme Court in one such case
relied on section 2-702 in allowing the aggrieved seller to reclaim
proceeds of the goods from a third person who was neither a bona
fide purchaser nor a lien creditor.39 Bankruptcy courts in Pennsylvania have permitted reclamation under section 2-507 in two badcheck cases subsequent to the Kravitz case.40 In both Pennsylvania
cases, section 2-507 was treated as providing an independent basis for
reclamation, not subject under Pennsylvania law to the claims of
lien creditors. In the first case, the court pointed out that the petition for reclamation was filed within ten days; in the second it was
not, but the court held applicable the presumption of section
88. See General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 847 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326
(1964), applying § 2-826 in a case not involving misrepresentation.
89. Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. Ct.
of Appeals 1965).
40. In Te Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964); In Te Mort, 208
F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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3-503(2) that thirty days is a reasonable time for presentment of a
check.
Reclamation could conceivably also be based on section 2-703(£),
which permits a seller to "cancel" in the event of certain types of
default by the buyer, hut the definition of "cancellation" in section
2-106 in terms of "termination" seems to limit its effect to discharge
of "obligations which are still executory on both sides."
However based, it has also been suggested that a right of reclamation might fall within the definition of "security interest" in section 1-201(37). In one of the Pennsylvania cases on reclamation
under section 2-507,41 one of the conclusions of law was that the
petitioner was entitled to the amount of the check "as a secured
creditor." But one of the consequences of a holding that a right to
rescind for fraud is a security interest fully subject to Article Nine
would be that, under section 9-203, the right could not be enforced
even against the fraudulent party unless the fraudulent party signed
a written agreement providing for such a right. Such an absurd conclusion can be avoided in any one of three ways. First, a right to
rescind is a right to undo the transaction-to reclaim the goods as
a substitute for the price-not a right to "secure" payment of the
price as required by the definition of "security interest" ;42 under
section 2-702(3), successful reclamation "excludes all other remedies."
Second, any such security interest is not the result of a transaction
"intended to create a security interest" and is not "created by contract" within the meaning of section 9-102, which defines the scope
of Article Nine on secured transactions. Third, even if the right is
deemed to he a security interest, such a security interest is exempted
by section 9-113 from the requirement of a written security agreement and from any requirement of filing, since it arises solely under
Article Two on sales and since a buyer who obtains goods by fraud
or the equivalent does not "lawfully obtain possession."43
Finally, there is a question whether the lien creditor, actual or
hypothetical, who is to prevail against a reclaiming seller must have
extended credit, or levied, or both, without knowledge of the buyer's
misrepresentation, or without notice of it, or in "good faith." Only
a creditor who becomes a lien creditor "without knowledge" of a
security interest is covered by section 9-30l(l)(b); section 9-301(3),
41. In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., supra note 40.
42. Cf. Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 119 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1941) ("proceeds" does not
include rights on rescission). See generally 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 11.1 (1965).
43. McAuliffe 8c Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154 N.E. 755 (1927).
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defining "lien creditor," declares that a trustee in bankruptcy is a
"lien creditor without knowledge," regardless of his personal knowledge, "unless all the creditors represented had knowledge of the
security interest . . . ." None of the other sections referred to above
as relevant to the rights of a lien creditor makes any reference to
notice or knowledge as a factor limiting or otherwise affecting the
lien creditor's rights.
If a pre-Code rule gives a lien creditor of the buyer a right to
prevent reclamation and is not "displaced" by section 2-702, but
rather is preserved by section 1-103, presumably the effect of knowledge or notice is left to the pre-Code law. Under what is called
above the orthodox rule, notice of the seller's claim would apparently prevent a levying creditor from becoming a bona fide purchaser at his execution sale, and knowledge of the claim would seem
to negate the reliance element essential to an estoppel.44 The Pennsylvania rule protecting subsequent creditors is less clear on this
point, but it seems fairly arguable that only creditors who extended
credit without knowledge should be permitted to prevail over the
defrauded seller. The Kravitz opinion did not consider the question,
perhaps because the trustee in bankruptcy was thought to be "the
ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed cap-a-pie
with every right and power which is conferred by the state upon its
most favored creditor who has acquired a lien by legal and equitable
proceedings. " 45
V.

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS

Although there was much concern over developments in bankruptcy law as they affected secured transactions, there is no indication that the sponsors of the Code were greatly concerned as to the
impact of the Bankruptcy Act on rights under section 2-702. Since
1949, the comment to section 2-702 has contained a statement that
reclamation is "preferential treatment," and in 1950 Professor Williston raised the question of preference in bankruptcy.46 But others
were concerned only that reclamation grounded on insolvency in
the absence of fraud might be disallowed in bankruptcy.47 Before
44.
45.
19.!!2).
46.
HA.Rv.
47.

See notes 11 &: 12 supra.
278 F.2d at 822, quoting In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss.
See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
L. REv. 561, 585 (1950).
See Malcolm, supra note 2, at 161-62; cf. ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 2.
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the Kravitz decision there seems to have been no published discussion of the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act.
Where state law permits reclamation as against a buyer of goods
but not as against third parties claiming under the buyer, the trustee
in bankruptcy might conceivably assert rights based on (a) the rights
of an actual creditor of the buyer, under sections 67a or 70e of the
Bankruptcy Act; (b) the rights of a hypothetical creditor, under section 70c; (c) the invalidity of statutory liens under section 67c; (d)
the right to avoid preferences under section 60; or (e) the invalidity
of state-created priorities conflicting with the federal priorities established by section 64.

A. Actual Creditors
Section 67a(l) renders void a lien obtained by levy within four
months before bankruptcy if the debtor was then insolvent. If an
actual creditor of a fraudulent buyer levied on the goods shortly before bankruptcy, his lien could thus be set aside by the trustee. Section 67a(3) provides that in such a case the court may on due notice
order the lien preserved for the benefit of the estate. If the seller's
right to reclaim is subject to the levy under state law, the trustee
could thus assert whatever rights the levying creditor could have
asserted against the seller. Those rights would include not only
priority under the Pennsylvania rule applied in the Kravitz case, but
also any estoppel arising under the orthodox rules.48
Section 70e(l) renders void a "transfer" which is "fraudulent as
against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor" of the
bankrupt. The definition in section 1(30) treats retention of a security title as a "transfer" from buyer to seller and may well be
broad enough to cover a seller's right to reclaim for fraud. If such
a "transfer" is subject to the rights of an actual creditor of the buyer,
it would be no great strain on the words "fraudulent" or "voidable"
to apply section 70e. Under section 70e (2), the transfer can be preserved for the benefit of the estate, but the trustee can also recover
the property for the estate, entirely free of the seller's interest, even
though the actual creditor could only insist on prior payment of a
comparatively small claim.49
48. See notes 11-14, supra.
49. See MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPI'CY §§ 284-85 (1956); cf., e.g., Friedman v. Sterling
Refrigerator Co., 104 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1939) (actual claim of $14.23 invalidated security
for $534.25).
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B. Hypothetical Creditors
Section 70c has, since 1910, conferred on the trustee in bankruptcy the rights of a creditor holding a legal lien on property of the
bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor actually exists; amendments to the provision in 1938, 1950, 1952, and 1966 seem not to
have changed its application for present purposes. 50 Section 70c has
been held to give the trustee the status not merely of a lien creditor
but of a lien creditor "without notice," and that status has sometimes been extravagently characterized as that of an "ideal" lien
creditor. 51
The concept of an "ideal" lien creditor was applied in Kravitz
to give the trustee the status of a lien creditor without notice who
extended credit after the buyer received the goods. In 1954, the same
concept had been applied in the Second Circuit to give the trustee
the rights under New York law of a hypothetical lien creditor without notice who had extended credit during a period of delay in recording, although the period had ended more than a year before
bankruptcy. 52 Fears were expressed that the trustee would be allowed "to take advantage of all sorts of hypothetical actions by a
hypothetical lien holder to improve his position," 53 but in 1961 the
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit decision, stating that
"the trustee acquires the status of a creditor as of the time when the
petition in bankruptcy is fi.led." 54 The Court also said: "The construction of § 70c which petitioner urges would give the trustee
power to set aside transactions which no creditor could void and
which injured no creditor."55
The result is to cast in doubt the concept of the "ideal lien creditor" applied in Kravitz. Since 1961, it has been held in the Ninth
Circuit that section 70c gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical
levying creditor only if at the date of bankruptcy there was an actual
creditor who could have obtained a lien by levy; the result was to
deny the trustee the status of a creditor who extended credit after
the date of the transaction under attack, because no actual creditor
had so extended credit. 56 On the other hand, it has been held in the
50. See note 21 supra; MAcLACHLAN, op. cit. supra note 49, at § 183.
51. Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 815
(1950); see note 45 supra.
52. Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1954).
53. See :MAcLAcHLAN, op. cit. supra note 49, at § 183.
54. Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 607 (1961).
55. Id. at 608.
56. Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962), 76 HARv. L. REv.
1296 (1963).
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Third Circuit that section 70c continues to grant the trustee the
status of a lien creditor without notice, apparently without regard
to whether there was an actual creditor without notice. 57 For the
time being, it seems unlikely that section 70c will bring into play a
hypothetical estoppel of a defrauded seller to assert his rights against
a hypothetical creditor of the fraudulent buyer.

C. Statutory Liens
Statutory liens on personal property are sometimes more like
priorities than like true liens. 58 The Chandler Act of 1938 eliminated state-created priorities from section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act,
and section 67 c subordinated state statutory liens on personal property not accompanied by possession to certain claims which were
given federal priority. A 1952 amendment invalidated such statutory
liens as against the trustee. If the right to reclaim under section 2-702
of the Code were treated as a statutory lien, it would thus be invalid
in bankruptcy.
In 1956, a decision in the Third Circuit held that a consensual
security interest provided for by statute was a "statutory lien." 59
The opinion was withdrawn and the question left open on rehearing,60 and a contrary rule was made explicit in the statute by a 1966
amendment.61 Nevertheless, reclamation by a defrauded seller seems
not to be affected by these developments, since reclamation is not
consensual. Moreover, it is to be hoped that a right to rescind, excluding all other remedies, will not be regarded as a "lien," just as
it should not be regarded as a "security interest" under the Code.62

D. Preferences
At the time section 2-702 first took shape, section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, had the effect
in some circumstances of conferring on the trustee in bankruptcy
57. In re Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (1962).
58. See 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 67.20; MACLACHLAN, op. cit, supra note
49, at §§ 155 & 213.
59. In re Quaker City Uniform Co., [1956-1959 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
11 58778 (3d Cir. 1956). Contra, In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J.
1955).
60. In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1030 (1957); 70 HARV. L. REv. 1296 (1957).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), added by 80 Stat. 268, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1966); see
H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
62. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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rights given by state law to bona fide purchasers from the debtor. 63
In 1950, shortly before promulgation of the Code, amendments to
section 60 abolished the "bona fide purchaser test" with reference to
personalty and substituted a test of perfection against lien creditors.64 The result is to suggest the possibility that, if a reclaiming
seller could be defeated by a hypothetical lien creditor of the fraudulent buyer, the "transfer" to the seller is not perfected, constitutes a
"preference," and can be set aside by the trustee if the seller has
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent at the time
the transfer is perfected. If the transfer is not perfected before bankruptcy, section 60a(2) deems it to be perfected "immediately before
the filing of the petition."
If reclamation is not accomplished before bankruptcy and, as
noted above, the trustee can defeat it under sections 70c or 70e of
the Bankruptcy Act, there is no need for him to rely on section 60.
On the other hand, if the reclaiming seller has improved his position
by taking possession shortly before bankruptcy, it seems entirely
proper to use section 60 to deprive him of any preferential advantage thus obtained. But if reclamation from the trustee would be
proper, reclamation from the buyer shortly before bankruptcy seems
not to satisfy the language of section 60a(l), which limits preferences
to transfers the effect of which "will be to enable such creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of
the same class." Thus the transfer to the seller would not constitute
a voidable preference and could not be set aside by the trustee. Recent developments do not seem to have undermined the reasoning
of earlier cases to this effect.65
E. State Priorities
Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act specifies five classes of debts
entitled to priority. Before 1938, fifth priority was accorded to debts
entitled to priority by state law, but the Chandler Act eliminated
state-created priorities except for landlords. In a number of situations, claims of statutory rights to property arising upon insolvency
have been held ineffective in bankruptcy as state-created priorities.66
63. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank 8: Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943); see

op.

MACLACHLAN,
cit. supra note 49, at §§ 257-61.
64. See MACLACHLAN, op. cit. supra note 49, at §§

262-66.
65. See note 24 supra.
66. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966); N. W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti,
343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965); Crosstown Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. SU (1960).

Michigan Law Review

1296

[Vol. 65:1281

It is this principle which provides whatever justification there is for
the fear that reclamation grounded on insolvency without fraud
might be contrary to the Bankruptcy Act.67 But if reclamation for
fraud is something other than a priority, it is hard to see why reclamation for innocent misrepresentation, mistake, or breach of warranty should stand on any different footing. There is a common-law
basis for rescission on such grounds, and section 2-702 of the Code
can easily be read, not as conferring a right arising on the buyer's
insolvency, but rather as putting short time limits on the right which
might exist without the statute. So read, it does not create a priority
but rather a beneficial interest in specific property. In any event, section 2-702 is not limited in its effect to insolvency proceedings: it
authorizes reclamation without regard to whether or when such
proceedings are begun.
VI. THE SPONSORS' RESPONSE TO Kravitz
The Kravitz decision in 1960 seems to have come as a surprise to
the draftsmen of the Code. There was general agreement that a right
to reclaim from a fraudulent buyer would lose most of its utility if
it was ineffective in bankruptcy and that the insertion of the words
"or lien creditor" had been a mistake. The bill to enact the Code in
Illinois was then in process; with Professor Llewellyn, the chief
draftsman of the Code, participating, the offending words were deleted from the bill. New Mexico and New York followed the Illinois
example, and a subcommittee of which the writer was chairman
recommended approval of the Illinois solution, but a vigorous argument against the amendment by Professor Shanker68 led to its rejection by the Permanent Editorial Board. The Board's report stated
the Kravitz case, added that "in most states the pre-Code law was
otherwise," noted the amendment in three states, and concluded:
"The Board is not convinced that the decision in In re Kravitz requires an amendment of this section." 69 The comment to section
2-702 was then rewritten to make appropriate cross-references to
other sections of the Code that are relevant to rights of lien
creditors.70
Four years later, California, Maine, and New Jersey had also fol67.
68.
69.

See note 47 supra; 79 HARV. L. REv. 598, 612 (1966).
See note 2 supra.
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, REPORT No. 1,
REPORT No. 2, at 48 (1964).
70.
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, REPORT No. l,

u.c.c.
u.c.c.

at 70 (1962), reprinted in
at 137; cf. part IV supra.
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lowed the Illinois example. The subcommittee was still of the same
opinion. Only three states remained who had not enacted the Code,71
and the Permanent Editorial Board was less reluctant than before to
re-examine Code provisions. On a renewed recommendation of the
subcommittee, the Board promulgated the Illinois amendment for
uniform adoption. 72 The "Reason for Change" states that the crossreference is confusing, summarizes the Kravitz case, adds that "the
result in Pennsylvania is to make the right of reclamation granted
by this section almost entirely illusory," repeats the statement that
pre-Code law was othenvise in most states, notes a subsequent decision contrary to Kravitz on the scope of section 70c of the Bankruptcy
Act, and concludes: "Six states have resolved the problem by deleting
the words 'or lien creditor' from this section, and there seems to be
no other practicable route to uniformity among the states." 73

VII. THE

RESULT

For the time being, the law is something less than uniform. But
the hope of the Code sponsors obviously is that general adoption of
the Illinois solution will produce uniformity. This requires us to
consider the horrid possibility that the deletion of the words "or lien
creditor" from section 2-702 still leaves the rights of lien creditors to
pre-Code law under section 1-103. The presence of those words was
not sufficient to "displace" pre-Code law in Kravitz; can their absence
be more effective? The answer given by a literal reading of the text
of the Code is clear: the seller has a right to reclaim under stated
conditions. That right is "subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary
course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section
2-403)." There is no similar exception for lien creditors, and the
legislative history recounted here makes it clear that the omission
was not inadvertent.
What if the seller has represented to a creditor of the buyer that
the buyer paid cash for the goods and the creditor has so relied that,
as against him, the seller is estopped to claim that the sale was on
credit? How does this affect the right to reclaim which the seller
would othenvise have? Deletion of the words "or lien creditor" may
be sufficient to "displace" a general rule preferring lien creditors,
but it seems very doubtful that it displaces the doctrine of estoppel.
71. Arizona, Idaho and Louisiana. Enactment in Arizona and Idaho came in 1967.
72. U.C.C, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
AMENDMENT OF THE U.C.C. 1 (1967).
73. Ibid.
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Therefore, if the creditor levies before the seller reclaims, he should
be able to assert the estoppel to defeat reclamation. If bankruptcy
follows, the trustee can set aside the levy under section 67a of the
Bankruptcy Act or he can preserve it for the benefit of the estate.
Even if there is no levy, if the right to reclaim is treated as a "transfer" and is "fraudulent" or "voidable," the trustee under section 70e
can assert the rights of the particular creditor, including any estoppel.
On the other hand, if there is no estoppel available to any actual
creditor, it now seems unlikely that the trustee can use section 70c
to assert a hypothetical estoppel available to a hypothetical creditor,
regardless of the outcome of pending disputes as to the scope of that
section. It should follow that reclamation before bankruptcy is not a
voidable preference even if there is an actual creditor who could
defeat reclamation. And nothing in the Code amendment gives color
to the treatment of a right to reclaim as a statutory lien or a statecreated priority.
Hopefully, 'therefore, uniform adoption of the Code amendment
will generally validate the right to reclaim stated in section 2-702
according to the terms of that section, in bankruptcy as well as out.
The law will then be, as it was in the beginning, the way most of us
thought it should be. After a troubled and perilous voyage, we will
have returned safely to the port from which we embarked.

